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Government Aid to Church-Related Education: An 
Alternative Rationale 
Church-related schools in the United States are in serious 
economic trouble, and have been for a number of years.' Govern- 
ment attempts to alleviate the problem through aid programs 
have often been challenged in the courts under the establishment 
clause of the first amendment,2 and many of these challenges 
have resulted in Supreme Court  decision^.^ Unfortunately, the 
reasoning behind these decisions is often difficult to understand 
and even more difficult to defend. Because of the continuing flow 
of aid-to-church-related-education cases being brought before the 
 court^,^ it is important that a consistent, defensible rationale be 
developed to justify old precedents and cope with new problems 
as they arise. This Comment will examine and criticize the Su- 
preme Court's reasoning in the aid cases and then attempt to 
sketch the outlines of a more satisfactory rationale." 
1. For a discussion of the serious financial problems facing private institutions of 
higher education in the United States, see NATIONAL COMMISSION ON UNITED METHODIST 
HIGHER EDUCATION, ENDANGERED SERVICE 47-51 (1976). For a discussion of the financial 
difficulties of nonpublic elementary and secondary schools, see Committee for Pub. Educ. 
& Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 815-20 (1973) (White, J., dissenting); New 
York State Council of Catholic School Superintendents, Another Aspect of the Financial 
Crisis in Education: The Current Problem of Support for the Education of Catholic Ele- 
mentary and Secondary School Children, 16 CATH. LAW. 15, 15-26 (1970) (analysis of the 
financial problems of New York parochial schools). 
2. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion . . . ." U.S. 
CONST. amend. I. 
3. See, e.g, Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977); Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works, 
426 U.S. 736 (1976); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975); Committee for Pub. Educ. 
& Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973); Hunt v. McNair, 413 U S .  734 (1973); 
Levitt v. Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty, 413 U.S. 472 (1973); Tilton v. 
Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971); Board of Educ. 
v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968); Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947). 
4. A large number of cases dealing with constitutional challenges to government 
programs aiding church-related education have been decided in the federal district courts 
during 1977 and 1978 alone. See, e.g., Minnesota Civil Liberties Union v. Roemer, 452 F. 
Supp. 1316 (D. Minn. 1978); Public Funds for Pub. Schools v. Byrne, 444 F. Supp. 1228 
(D.N.J. 1978); Filler v. Port Wash. Union Free School Dist., 436 F. Supp. 1231 (E.D.N.Y. 
1977); Americans United for the Separation of Church & State v. Blanton, 433 F. Supp. 
97 (M.D. Tenn.), aff'd, 434 U.S. 803 (1977); Smith v. Board of Governors, 429 F. Supp. 
871 (W.D.N.C.), aff'd, 434 U.S. 803 (1977). 
5. The scope of this Comment, then, is limited to government aid programs that 
impact on church-related schools. Although the principles that are developed may in 
certain instances have broader applicability, no attempt will be made to generalize the 
discussion to other areas of church-state relationships. 
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In Lemon v. Kurtzman, "he Supreme Court distilled from 
previous opinions three tests that have proven to be the doctrinal 
starting point for determining the constitutionality of govern- 
ment enactments challenged under the establishment clause: 
"First, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; sec- 
ond, its principal or primary effect must be one that neither ad- 
vances nor inhibits religion . . . ; finally, the statute must not 
foster 'an excessive government entanglement with religion.' "' 
The first two tests express the idea that the government 
should not enact programs having either the purposeR or the effect 
of advancing or inhibiting religion. This idea, which lies a t  the 
heart of establishment clause theory, will be referred to as the 
value of ne~ t ra l i ty .~  The third test has two branches. The first 
branch suggests that excessive involvement of the state in reli- 
gious activities, or administrative entanglement, is an evil to be 
a~oided.~Vl?he s cond branch suggests that political divisions 
along religious lines, or political entanglement, should also be 
guarded against." These values, neutrality and the avoidance of 
administrative and political entanglement, have been referred to 
repeatedly by the Court. They constitute the theoretical founda- 
tion of establishment clause analysis. 
Although the values underlying the establishment clause are 
clear, their practical implications are often in doubt. This Section 
will briefly outline the cases in which the Supreme Court has 
attempted to apply these abstract values to practical problems 
6. 403 U.S. 602 (1971). 
7. Id. a t  612-13 (citations omitted). 
8. No aid program has ever been invalidated on the grounds that it lacked a secular 
legislative purpose. This is probably due to the Court's reluctance to question legislative 
motives. See Note, Establishment Clause Anulysis of Legislative and Administrative Aid 
to Religion, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 1175, 1179-80 (1974). 
9. The value of neutrality has been discussed with approval in a number of Supreme 
Court opinions. See, e.g., Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 744, 747-48 (1976) 
(plurality opinion); Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664,668-70 (1970); Epperson v. Arkan- 
sas, 393 U.S. 97, 103-04 (1968). 
10. The Court has spoken out against the evils of administrative entanglement in 
several cases. See, e.g., Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 369-72 (1975); Lemon v. Kurtz- 
man, 403 U.S. 602, 619-22 (1971). 
11. The value of avoiding political entanglement has been discussed with approval 
in several opinions. See, e.g., Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 372 (1975); Committee for 
Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 794-98 (1973); Lemon v. Kurtz- 
man, 403 U.S. 602, 622-24 (1971). 
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involving government aid to church-related education. The ra- 
tionale relied upon in these cases will be examined and criticized. 
Since the Court has taken a significantly different view of aid 
involving sectarian elementary and secondary schools (parochial 
schools) as opposed to sectarian colleges, these will be considered 
separately. 
A. Aid to Parochial Education 
The first important case involving aid to parochial education 
was Everson v. Board of Education.12 In Everson, the Court as- 
serted that the establishment clause meant that neither a state 
nor the federal government "can pass laws which aid one religion, 
aid all religions, or perfer one religion over another. . . . No Tax 
in any amount, large or small, can be levied to support any reli- 
gious activities or institutions."13 In spite of this absolute "no 
aid" rhetoric, the Everson Court upheld a state program provid- 
ing busfare refunds to the parents of students attending both 
public and parochial schools. The Court reasoned that the state 
was merely extending the benefits of general welfare legislation 
to all citizens without regard to their religious beliefs." In his 
dissent, Justice Rutledge argued that in reality the majority opin- 
ion permitted the government to do what was expressly forbid- 
den; that is, to support religious institutions. He contended that 
subsidizing busfares, an essential element of the costs of pa- 
rochial education, constituted as a practical matter aid to reli- 
gion. l5 
After Everson, the next important case involving aid to pa- 
rochial education was Board of Education v. Allen,l+here the 
Supreme Court upheld a state program providing secular text- 
book loans to students attending both public and private (includ- 
ing parochial) schools. In making its decision, the Court recog- 
nized that parochial schools have dual functions, secular and 
sectarian. It intimated that aid to the sectarian function was 
impermissible. However, the Court was unwilling to agree with 
the parties challenging the program that either "all teaching in a 
sectarian school is religious or that the processes of secular and 
religious training are so intertwined that secular textbooks fur- 
12. 330 U.S. l (1947). 
13. Id. at 15-16. 
14. Id. at 16-18. 
15. Id. at 44-49 (Rutledge, J., dissenting). 
16. 392 U.S. 236 (1968). 
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nished to students by the public are in fact instrumental in the 
teaching of religion."17 
In Lemon v. Kurtzman, la the Court used a two-step approach 
- 
to disallow state programs providing salary subsidies to teachers 
of secular subjects in parochial schools. First, the Court held that 
the establishment clause prohibits a teacher receiving govern- 
ment salary subsidies from inculcating religion.lg Second, the 
Court found that the government inspections required in order to 
ensure compliance with the constitutional rule would create ex- 
cessive administrative entanglement.20 The Court also observed 
that there were substantial dangers of political entanglement in- 
herent in these programs. "The potential for political divisiveness 
related to religious belief and practice" was aggravated in these 
programs "by the need for continuing annual appropriations and 
the likelihood of larger and larger demands as costs and popula- 
tions 
In Committee for Public Education & Religious Liberty u. 
Nyquist,22 the Court disallowed a program that provided state 
subsidies for the maintenance and repair of parochial school facil- 
ities. The Court reasoned that these facilities would be used, a t  
least in part, for sectarian p ~ r p o s e s . ~ ~  In this same case, tuition 
refunds and tax benefits for the parents of parochial schoolchild- 
ren were disallowed on the ground that there were no restrictions 
guaranteeing that the government money would be used only for 
secular purposes .24 
17. Id. at 245-48. Subsequent Supreme Court cases have upheld other textbook pro- 
grams similar to the one upheld in Allen. See Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 236-38 
(1977) (plurality opinion); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349,359-62 (1975) (plurality opin- 
ion). However, the Court has repudiated a significant element of the Allen rationale. See 
notes 37-39 and accompanying text infra. 
18. 403 U.S. 602 (1971). Cf. Americans United for Separation of Church & State v. 
Oakey, 339 F. Supp. 545 (D. Vt. 1972) (program providing public teachers and educational 
materials for the teaching of secular subjects in parochial schools held unconstitutional); 
Johnson v. Sanders, 319 F. Supp. 421 (D. Conn. 1970) (program whereby state 
"purchased" secular instruction from parochial schools disallowed), aff'd, 403 U.S. 955 
(1971). 
19. 403 U.S. at 619. 
20. Id. 
21. Id. at 622-24. 
22. 413 U.S. 756 (1973). 
23. Id. at 774-80. 
24. Id. at 780-94. The Court was unimpressed by the fact that since parents receiving 
tuition reimbursements were free to spend the money in any manner they chose, there was 
no assurance that actual government dollars would end up in the hands of the parochial 
schools. Neither was the Court impressed by the fact that the parents participating in the 
tax benefit program received no actual cash payments; the state merely refrained from 
collecting a certain portion of their taxes. The Court held, rather, that "neither form of 
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By the time Nyquist was decided, a recurrent theme had 
developed in Supreme Court opinions which will be denominated 
the "no direct aid rule."25 The Court, recognizing that church- 
related education has two aspects, secular and sectarian, disal- 
lowed aid to sectarian activities but permitted aid to secular ac- 
tivities?The Court intimated that  under circumstances where 
separation of secular and sectarian activities was impossiblez7 or 
unenforceable without the creation of excessive administrative 
entanglement," no aid whatsoever was permissible. The estab- 
lishment clause was held violated if even one penny of govern- 
ment money went to support religion. On the other hand, the 
Court permitted secular activities to be funded to the extent they 
could be isolated, even if this aid had the effect of freeing other 
funds to be used for sectarian  purpose^.^ 
Subsequent cases have followed the no direct aid rule. Gov- 
ernment programs providing parochial school students with 
standardized testing and scoring services were upheld on the 
grounds that they constituted aid to secular activities only." The 
aid is sufficiently restricted to assure that i t  will not have the impermissible effect of 
advancing the sectarian activities of religious schools." Id. a t  794. 
Tuition reimbursement or tax benefit programs similar to those challenged in Nyquist 
have generally been disallowed by the district courts. Public Funds for Pub. Schools v. 
Byrne, 444 F. Supp. 1228 (D.N.J. 1978); Kosydar v. Wolman, 353 F. Supp. 744 (S.D. Ohio 
1972), aff'd sub nom. Grit v. Wolman, 413 U.S. 901 (1973); Wolman v. Essex, 342 F. Supp. 
399 (S.D. Ohio), aff'd, 409 U.S. 808 (1972). The United States District Court for Minne- 
sota, however, recently upheld a state enactment allowing the parents of all children 
attending both public and private (including parochial) schools to deduct from their 
personal income for purposes of computing state income tax an amount corresponding to 
their expenses for tuition, transportation, and secular textbooks. Minnesota Civil Liber- 
ties Union v. Roemer, 452 F. Supp. 1316 (D. Minn. 1978). This program may be distin- 
guishable from those disallowed in prior cases in that it benefited parents of children 
attending both public and private schools. 
25. The term "no direct aid rule" has never been employed by the Court; it is an  
invention of the author. The Court expressed a similar thought when it stated that direct 
aid to religious activities is impermissible, while enactments that have "an indirect and 
incidental effect beneficial to religious institutions" are permissible. Committee for Pub. 
Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 775 (1973). 
26. See, e.g.,  Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736, 755 (1976) (plurality 
opinion); Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 774-75 
(1973). 
27. E.g., Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736,755 (1976) (plurality opinion); 
Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 680-81 (1971) (plurality opinion). 
28. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 616-19 (1971). 
29. "Stated another way, the Court has not accepted the recurrent argument that all 
aid is forbidden because aid to one aspect of an institution frees it to spend its other 
resources on religious ends." Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 742-43 (1973). 
30. Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 238-41 (1977) (plurality opinion). But cf. Com- 
mittee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Levitt, 414 F. Supp. 1174 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) 
(government reimbursement of expenses allocable to compliance with state-mandated 
attendance reporting and administration of state-prepared examinations a t  parochial 
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provision of speech, hearing, and psychological diagnostic serv- 
ices on parochial school premises by school board employees and 
physicians working under government contracts was also up- 
held.31 The Court reasoned that the nature of these activities 
minimized the danger of religious-inculcation by those perform- 
ing the services and hence the necessity of entangling inspec- 
t i o n ~ . ~ ~  A program furnishing parochial schoolchildren with thera- 
peutic, guidance, and remedial services a t  locations apart from 
parochial school premises was upheld because no entangling in- 
teraction between public and parochial school officials was re- 
quired to ensure secular content.33 On the other hand, administra- 
tive entanglement dangers were held sufficient to disallow provi- 
sion by public employees of remedial and accelerated instruction, 
guidance counseling and testing, and speech and hearing thera- 
peutic (as opposed to diagnostic) services when conducted on 
parochial school premises.34 Also struck down were statutes pro- 
viding public funds for the preparation of examinations by par- 
ochial  schoolteacher^^^ and government-funded busing for field 
trips.36 The Court reasoned that the implementation of measures 
sufficient to ensure that no religion seeped into the preparation 
of the examinations or the teaching associated with the field trips 
would entail excessive administrative entanglement. 
schools held unconstitutional by district court), vacated and remanded, 433 U.S. 902 
(1977). 
31. Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 299 (1977). Accord, Filler v. Port Wash. Union Free 
School Dist., 436 F. Supp. 1231 (E.D.N.Y. 1977). 
32. Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 241-44 (1977). 
33. Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 244-48 (1977). Accord, Filler v. Port Wash. 
Union Free School Dist., 436 F. Supp. 1231 (E.D.N.Y. 1977). The Wolman Court also 
noted the following: 
The fact that a unit on a neutral site on occasion may serve only sectarian 
pupils does not provoke the same concerns that troubled the Court in Meek. [In 
Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 367-71 (1975), the Court disallowed a program 
providing similar services on parochial school premises.] The influence on the 
therapist's behavior that is exerted by the fact that he serves a sectarian pupil 
is qualitatively different from the influence of the pervasive atmosphere of a 
religious institution. 
433 U.S. a t  247 (footnote omitted). 
34. Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 367-72 (1975). The Court also noted that these 
programs created a serious potential for political entanglement. Id. at  372. 
35. Levitt v. Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty, 413 U.S. 472 (1973). Cf. 
Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Levitt, 414 F. Supp. 1174 (S.D.N.Y. 
1976) (government reimbursement of expenses allocable to compliance with state- 
mandated attendance reporting and administration of state-prepared examinations a t  
parochial schools held unconstitutional by district court), vacated and remanded, 433 
U.S.  902 (1977). 
36. Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 252-55 (1977) (plurality opinion). 
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Although the no direct aid rule has been consistently upheld, 
subsequent cases have diverged from the Allen-Lemon-Nyquist 
rationale in one respect. In Meek u. Pittenger,37 the Court disal- 
lowed a program that provided loans of instructional materials 
such as maps, charts, and laboratory equipment to parochial 
schools. The Court was not convinced by the argument that these 
materials, like secular textbooks, are incapable of diversion to 
religious uses and are hence self-policing-no entangling inspec- 
tions are required to guarantee that they will not be used to 
inculcate religion. Rather, the Court concluded that parochial 
schools are so pervasively sectarian that secular and sectarian 
activities cannot be separated; hence, any direct subsidy imper- 
missibly aids religion.3R This determination is disturbing because 
it directly contradicts a premise that was apparently essential to 
the Court's ruling in Allen and was not questioned in either 
Lemon or Nyquist. 38 
B. R-ograms Aiding Church-Related Higher Education 
Substantially more government aid has been allowed to flow 
to church-related colleges than to parochial  school^,^ largely be- 
cause of the Court's determination that church-related colleges 
are generally less sectarian than parochial schools." The Court 
has found that major portions of the curriculum a t  most church- 
related colleges can be labeled secular and are hence eligible for 
government subsidies." Furthermore, it has been accepted that 
37. 421 U.S. 349 (1975). 
38. Id. a t  362-66. See also Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 248-51 (1977); Public 
Funds for Pub. Schools v. Marburger, 358 F. Supp. 29,36-39 (D.N.J. 1973), aff'd, 417 U.S. 
961 (1974). 
39. The Court in Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 251 n.18 (1977), recognized this 
inconsistency between Allen and Meek and accepted the Meek rationale, refusing to 
overrule Allen only as a matter of stare decisis. See generally Survey-A Survey of Se- 
lected Contemporary Church-State Boblems, 51 NOTRE DAME LAW. 737, 759-69 (1976). 
40. The Supreme Court cases dealing with government aid to church-related colleges 
are Roemer'v. Board of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736 (1976) (noncategorical grants to church- 
related colleges approved where statute prohibited sectarian use of funds and none of the 
aided institutions were so pervasively sectarian that secular and sectarian aspects could 
not be separated); Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734 (1973) (participation of church-related 
colleges not found to be pervasively sectarian in program whereby the state issued revenue 
bonds to assist in the construction of facilities to be used for secular purposes upheld); 
and Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971) (participation of church-related colleges not 
found to be pervasively sectarian in federal program providing grants for the construction 
of academic facilities to be used for secular purposes upheld). 
41. Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 685-87 (1971) (plurality opinion). 
42. Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736, 755-61 (1976) (plurality opinion); 
Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 679-82 (1971) (plurality opinion). 
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the highly secular atmosphere a t  most church-related colleges 
lessens the dangers of administrative entanglement." Since the 
chances of religion contaminating subsidized portions of the cur- 
riculum would be slight, the requisite inspections by government 
officials to ensure that no government money goes to sectarian 
activities could be "quick and n~njudgmental ."~~ 
This generally favorable prognosis for programs aiding 
church-related colleges must be qualified in one respect. The no 
direct aid rule mandates that no aid whatsoever can flow to insti- 
tutions in which religion is so pervasive that it is impossible to 
separate the secular and the sectarian aspects.45 Nevertheless, 
some lower courts have permitted students attending certain per- 
vasively sectarian institutions to share in the benefits of govern- 
ment assistance programs available to both public and private 
college students .46 
43. Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736, 761-67 (1976) (plurality opinion); 
Hunt v. McNair, 413 U S .  734, 745-46 (1973); Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U S .  672, 684-88 
(1971) (plurality opinion). The Tilton Court also noted that the potential for political 
divisiveness is less with colleges and universities then with elementary and secondary 
schools. Id. a t  688-89. 
44. The phrase is used in Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works, 426 U S .  736, 764 (1976). 
45. See note 27 and accompanying text supra. 
46. See Americans United for the Separation of Church & State v. Blanton, 433 F. 
Supp. 97 (M.D. Tenn.) (financial assistance program available to resident students at- 
tending accredited Tennessee public and nonpublic colleges upheld; among the partici- 
pating institutions were sectarian and pervasively sectarian colleges), aff'd, 434 U.S. 803 
(1977); Durham v. McLeod, 259 S.C. 409, 192 S.E.2d 202 (1972) (state program authoriz- 
ing establishment of educational assistance authority to make and guarantee loans to 
college students attending the public or private institution of their choice upheld; sectar- 
ian colleges and probably some pervasively sectarian colleges were allowed to participate), 
appeal dismissed, 413 U.S. 902 (1973). Cf. Bob Jones University v. Johnson, 396 F. Supp. 
597 (D.S.C. 1974) (provision of V.A. benefits to students attending a pervasively sectarian 
college held not violative of the establishment clause, but disallowed because of racially 
discriminatory policies of the college), aff'd, 529 F.2d 514 (4th Cir. 1975); Americans 
United v. Rogers, 538 S.W.2d 711 (Mo.) (tuition grants to students attending public and 
approved private colleges upheld; sectarian colleges were allowed to participate, but un- 
clear whether any pervasively sectarian colleges were allowed participation), cert. denied, 
429 U S .  1029 (1976). But cf. Lendall v. Cook, 432 F. Supp. 971 (E.D. Ark. 1977) (scholar- 
ship program available to public and private college students upheld; sectarian colleges 
were allowed participation, but the court apparently would have disallowed participation 
by pervasively sectarian colleges had there been any receiving benefits); Smith v. Board 
of Governors, 429 F. Supp. 871 (W.D.N.C.) (scholarship programs available to private 
college students upheld; sectarian colleges allowed participation, but the court apparently 
would have disallowed participation of pervasively sectarian colleges had there been any 
receiving benefits), aff'd, 434 U S .  803 (1977); Americans United for the Separation of 
Church & State v. Dunn, 384 F. Supp. 714 (M.D. Tenn. 1974) (tuition grant program 
allowing for the participation of church-related colleges disallowed; case remanded by the 
Supreme Court because of changes made in the administration of the program), vacated 
and remanded sub nom. Blanton v. Americans United for the Separation of Church & 
State, 421 U S .  958 (1975); Americans United for Separation of Church & State v. Bubb, 
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C.  The Need for a Different Rationale 
The Supreme Court's school aid decisions are subject to criti- 
cism in at least two respects. First, as has already been men- 
tioned, there is an inconsistency between Board of Education u. 
A llen4' and more recent opinions: the Allen decision assumed that 
religion is not so pervasive in parochial schools that secular and 
sectarian aspects cannot be separated, while recent decisions 
have assumed just the opposite.48 This criticism is minor in the 
sense that it does not directly bring into question the validity of 
the Court's rationale; it merely suggests that either Allen or the 
more recent cases were based on an incorrect factual determina- 
tion. 
The second criticism is more significant: there appears to be 
a fundamental conflict between the value of neutrality and the 
results of the cases. The Court continues to pay homage to neu- 
trality while approving programs that appear to provide aid to 
religion.'"ndeed, most if not all of the programs that have been 
379 F. Supp. 872 (D. Kan. 1974) (students attending pervasively sectarian colleges not 
allowed to participate in state tuition grant program aiding students attending indepen- 
dent colleges; students attending other church-related colleges allowed to participate). 
47. 392 U.S. 236 (1968). 
48. See notes 37-39 and accompanying text supra. 
49. The classic formulation of this criticism was rendered by Mr. Justice Jackson in 
his dissent to Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 19 (1947) (Jackson, J., dissenting): 
In fact, the undertones of the opinion, advocating complete and uncompromis- 
ing separation of Church from State, seem utterly discordant with its conclusion 
yielding support to their commingling in educational matters. The case which 
irresistably comes to mind as the most fitting precedent is that of Julia who, 
according to Byron's reports, "whispering 'I will ne'r consent,'-consented." 
See also id. a t  28-74 (Rutledge, J., dissenting). 
The Supreme Court in Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455 (1973), disallowed a Missis- 
sippi statutory program under which textbooks were loaned free of charge to students 
attending public and private schools without regard to whether participating private 
schools had racially discriminatory policies. The Court reasoned as follows: 
Free textbooks, like tuition grants directed to private school students, are a form 
of financial assistance inuring to the benefit of the private schools themselves. 
An inescapable educational cost for students in both public and private schools 
is the expense of providing all necessary learning materials. When, as here, that 
necessary expense is borne by the State, the economic consequence is to give 
aid to the enterprise; if the school engages in discriminatory practices the State 
by tangible aid in the form of textbooks thereby gives support to such discrimi- 
nation. Racial discrimination in state-operated schools is barred by the Consti- 
tution and "[ilt is also axiomatic that a state may not induce, encourage or 
promote private persons to accomplish what it is constitutionally forbidden to 
accomplish." Lee u. Macon County Board of Education, 267 F. Supp. 458,475- 
476 (MD Ala. 1967). 
Id. at 463-65 (footnote omitted). It is difficult to explain why this same kind of reasoning 
should not be employed to disallow as a violation of the principle of neutrality the provi- 
sion of secular textbooks to students attending parochial schools. 
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approved provide financial aid to religion in the sense that they 
channel government money to sectarian institutions either di- 
rectly or indirectly through students and parents. The fact that 
government assistance is restricted to the secular aspects of 
church-related education does not,' as a practical matter, keep it 
from furthering religion. The sectarian school, in the words of 
Justice Douglas, is "an organism living on one budget."50 Aid to 
a part, be it classified as secular or sectarian, necessarily aids the 
whole. The Supreme Court's rationale is unsatisfactory, then, 
because it leaves unresolved the paradox of simultaneous Court 
approval of the value of neutrality, which would appear to disal- 
low all aid, and programs which in fact appear to provide aid. 
Recent Supreme Court decisions signal a growing dissatisfac- 
tion with the current rationale. None of the three latest cases 
dealing with government aid to church-related education, 
Wolman u. Walter,51 Roemer v. Board of Public Works,52 and 
Meek u. Pittenger," was able to command a majority opinion 
throughout. Altogether, fifteen separate opinions were filed in 
these three cases. It would apear, then, that this area of the law 
stands in need of a more uniformly acceptable rationale. 
In attempting to sketch the outlines of a more satisfactory 
rationale, it is appropriate to begin with the values that underlie 
the establishment clause. The implications of the values of neu- 
trality and the avoidance of administrative and political entan- 
glement will be discussed in the context of government programs 
aiding education. Then, consideration will focus on the relevance 
of five factors the Court has identified as bearing upon the judi- 
cial determination of whether these values are vindicated. 
A. Values Underlying the Establishment Clause 
1. Neutrality 
In the context of aid to education, government programs can 
advance or inhibit religion in two different ways. First, the gov- 
ernment may enact programs that have the effect of either help- 
ing or hindering sectarian schools. Second, the government may 
50. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 641 (1971) (Douglas, J., concurring). 
51. 433 U.S. 229 (1977). 
52. 426 U.S. 736 (1976). 
53. 421 U.S. 349 (1975). 
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deal with sectarian schools in such a way as to give the impression 
of either official sponsorship or disapproval of religion. The value 
of neutrality suggests that government actions should neither 
help nor hinder sectarian schools and should neither sponsor nor 
manifest official disapproval of religion. For the purposes of this 
Comment, these two principles will be called, respectively, edu- 
cational neutrality and sponsorships4 neutrality. 
a. Educational neutrality. In considering the principle of 
'educational neutrality, it is instructive to examine the effects on 
sectarian education of programs that aid public schools alone and 
also of programs that aid both public and sectarian schools. 
These effects will vary according to the nature of the sectarian 
institutions. For example, consider a highly sectarian school 
sponsored by a church that holds attendance at  this school to be 
a religious req~i rement .~~  Exclusion from a program subsidizing 
public education would probably have little impact on this 
school. Since attendance is essentially an act of faith, and sub- 
stantially all of the students who attend are believers or the chil- 
dren of believers, there would no mass student exodus should 
facilities and services lag behind those available at corresponding 
public institutions. Moreover, if this school were permitted to 
share in the benefits of programs aiding public education, atten- 
dance might increase greatly as a larger number of believers find 
it within their financial capabilities to attend or send their chil- 
dren. 
On the other hand, the effects of government aid programs 
on a mildly sectarian school would be very different. For example, 
consider a church-related college a t  which the inculcation and 
practice of religion is only a minor aspect. Although many of the 
students enjoy and take advantage of the limited sectarian activi- 
ties available, their main purpose in attending is to obtain what 
the school principally provides-secular education." If this insti- 
tution is allowed full participation in government programs subsi- 
dizing corresponding public schools, the level of enrollment may 
increase, but probably only to the degree that enrollment a t  cor- 
responding public colleges increases. On the other hand, if this 
54. The Supreme Court on several occasions has held that sponsorship of religion is 
one of the evils the establishment clause was designed to prevent. E.g., Meek v. Pittenger, 
421 U.S. 349, 359 (1975) (plurality opinion); Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Lib- 
erty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 772 (1973); Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U S .  664,668 (1970). 
55. This seems to be a fairly accurate representation of the typical parochial school. 
See notes 86-89 and accompanying text infra. 
56. This seems to correspond with the Supreme Court's description of the prototype 
sectarian college. See note 97 and accompanying text infra. 
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school is denied participation in government aid programs, a dra- 
matic reduction in enrollment could result. Since the students 
who typically consider attending this college are mainly con- 
cerned with secular education, they are unlikely to be willing to 
forego the benefits of improved services and facilities or the lower 
costs available at comparable government institutions in order to 
enjoy the limited sectarian aspects present at this school. If gov- 
ernment funding of public colleges continues to increase, the 
school a t  some point will probably be forced to close or drastically 
reduce the scope of its  operation^.^' 
These considerations lead one to question the facile assump- 
tion that permitting church-related schools to participate in gov- 
ernment educational subsidies always has the effect of advancing 
sectarian education. Indeed, this premise may be strictly true 
only in.the case of the most highly sectarian schools. Rather, it 
would appear that a certain amount of aid to church-related 
schools is justifiable in order to allow them to maintain their 
economic stability in the face of ever-increasing government 
funding of competing public schools. 
Educational neutrality, then, should not be equated with 
disallowance of all programs that have the effect of channeling 
government money into church-related education. Instead, this 
Comment offers the following proposal which constitutes the crux 
of an alternative rationale: Government programs subsidizing 
education should be termed educationally neutral if no change in 
the success or failure of church-related schools can be traced to 
their enactment. Under the principle of educational neutrality, 
the government would be permitted (not requireds8) to allow for 
the participation of sectarian schools in general" educational aid 
57. See generally Americans United for Separation of Church & State v. Bubb, 379 
F. Supp. 872, 877 (D. Kan. 1974). 
Mildly sectarian colleges of this type are important to religious institutions in at least 
two respects. First, even though the sectarian influence manifest at these schools may be 
slight, it is nevertheless important in that it may constitute the only religious exposure 
that many of the attending students are willing to accept. Second, the very existence of 
church-related colleges tends to enhance the prestige, social acceptability, and intellectual 
credibility of religion. The widespread failure of these institutions (which probably com- 
prise the majority of the sectarian colleges in the United States) would constitute a major 
loss to religion. 
58. In recognition of the legislatures' wide discretion in allocating the benefits of 
public welfare legislation, it would probably be unwise to require state subsidies of sectar- 
ian schools. 
59. It might be wise to require that all programs rendering subsidies to sectarian 
schools also be made available to corresponding nonsectarian private schools. If only 
sectarian private schools are subsidized, aid programs may be interpreted as governmental 
sponsorship of religion. 
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programs to the extent necessary to maintain their current sta- 
~ U S . ~ O  
This principle is susceptible to a mechanical application. 
The courts might logically determine that the best objective mea- 
sure of the success or failure of sectarian schools is the level of 
enrollment." Then, whenever an aid program was challenged 
under the establishment clause, the courts would determine, with 
the help of expert testimony, whether the net effect of the pro- 
gram would be to increase enrollment at sectarian schools. If so, 
the program would be held violative of the establishment clause; 
if not, the program would be upheld as within the principle of 
educational neutrality. 
This mechanical- application of the principle of educational 
neutrality is undesirable, however, because it would likely lead to 
the partial participation of sectarian schools in a large number of 
educational programs, creating substantial problems of adminis- 
tration. From the standpoint of administrative efficiency and cer- 
tainty in the law, it would be preferable to allow for the full 
participation of sectarian schools in limited classes of general 
educational subsidies. The more vulnerable the institution to in- 
creasing governmental expenditures for public education, the 
larger the class of subsidies in which it should be allowed to 
participate. 
This concept of educational neutrality is useful because it 
provides a rationale for limited government subsidization of 
church-related education. It resolves the paradox of simultaneous 
Court adherence to the principle of neutrality and approval of 
programs that in fact channel aid to sectarian schools. More im- 
portantly, this concept provides a general framework within 
which specific decisions can be made. It would probably not be 
wise for courts to make specific judgments concerning the effects 
of government aid on individual sectarian schools.62 It would, 
60. The principle of educational neutrality is in harmony with the ideas of Professor 
Giannella, who "sanction[s] the propriety of governmental support-of religious institu- 
tions to the extent necessary to counterbalance the negative influences which the state's 
increased societal role has on religion." Giannella, Religious Liberty, Nonestablishment, 
and Doctrinal Development: Part II. The Nonestablishment, Binciple, 81 HAW. L. REV. 
513, 587 (1968). 
61. Of course, the success or failure of church-related schools can be defined on the 
basis of a number of factors. The regard with which these schools are held in the com- 
munity, the degree of sectarianism they manifest, and the quality of secular education 
they provide may all be important factors in measuring their success or failure and their 
contribution to religion. However, the number of students who are enrolled is possibly the 
most important factor, and undoubtedly it is the most easily measured. 
62. The making of individual determinations might lead to excessive litigation. This 
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however, be acceptable for courts to make general determinations 
regarding the relative vulnerability of different classes of sectar- 
ian schools to increasing government spending for public educa- 
tion and consequently their eligibility for participation in govern- 
ment aid programs. The principle of educational neutrality estab- 
lishes the broad outline of this alternative rationale; considera- 
tions that will be discussed subsequently are available to fill in 
the details. 
b. Sponsorship neutrality. Whenever the state places or 
appears to place its imprimatur on one church or on religion 
generally, it has impermissibly aided religion in violation of the 
principle of sponsorship neutrality." Even though a program aid- 
ing church-related education may perfectly conform with the 
principle of educational neutrality, it may be objectionable if the 
form the aid takes gives the impression that the state is wielding 
its power, influence, or financial support in favor of a particular 
church or religion in general.64 
But, while sponsorship neutrality has rightfully been given 
great emphasis in deciding some establishment clause cases," its 
importance in the area of government aid to church-related edu- 
cation should not be overstated. Unless sectarian education is 
given special preference in the administration of government aid, 
it is unlikely the public will get the impression that state policy 
is proreligion. Indeed, the complete denial of aid might constitute 
in the eyes of many a manifestation of hostility toward religion?" 
Sponsorship neutrality could be called upon, however, to invali- 
is especially undesirable in the area of church-related education, because litigation re- 
quires sectarian schools to submit to extensive discovery proceedings and public scrutiny 
of their internal affairs, raising the spectre of administrative entanglement. Furthermore, 
the public discussion incident to major litigation of this kind may tend to create political 
entanglement. 
63. See Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 450 (1971); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 
421, 430-32 (1962). 
64. See Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 430-32 (1962). 
65. Although the term "sponsorship neutrality" has not been employed by the Court, 
certain practices have been disallowed because they were found to have the impermissible 
effect of placing the power and influence of the state behind religious practices. E.g., 
School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963) (daily Bible reading and prayer recitation 
in public schools disallowed); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962) (daily recital of state- 
composed prayer in public schools held unconstitutional). 
66. The Court has held that it is impermissible for the state to manifest hostility 
toward religion. In the words of Justice Clark, "We agree of course that the State may 
not establish a 'religion of secularism' in the sense of affirmatively opposing or showing 
hostility to religion, thus 'preferring those who believe in no religion over those who do 
believe.' " School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 225 (1963) (quoting Zorach v. Clauson, 
343 U.S. 306, 314 (1952)). 
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date programs that give specific assistance to highly sectarian 
functions. 
2. Entanglement 
If government programs neither injure nor assist religion, 
they comply with the value of neutrality. If they create undesira- 
ble governmental incursions into the realm of religion, or undue 
involvement of religion in the political process, however, they 
may be objectionable because of administrative or political en- 
tanglement. 
a. Administrative entanglement. Administrative entangle- 
ment occurs when, in the words of Chief Justice Burger, there is 
"active involvement of the sovereign in religious a c t i ~ i t y . " ~ ~  In 
this complex society there are innumerable contacts between 
church and state. It is clear that government enactments such as 
"fire inspections, building and zoning regulations, and state re- 
quirements under compulsory school-attendance laws," which 
impinge directly or indirectly upon sectarian activities, are 
unobjectionable? Similarly, there should be no constitutional 
objection to government and church officials consulting together 
regarding issues of common concern. Administrative entangle- 
ment problems of constitutional dimensions generally arise only 
when the government begins to regulate those aspects of sectarian 
institutions having ideological and particularly religious content. 
It should not be offensive to constitutional values for the govern- 
ment to exercise some control over the nonideological service as- 
pects of church-related education, such as transportation, health 
care, and food services. The government typically regulates such 
activities to some degree regardless of who performs them. Seri- 
ous administrative entanglement problems may follow, however, 
should the government begin to regulate what goes on the class- 
room. 
There is a close correlation between the dangers of sponsor- 
ship and administrative entanglement. As government control 
over sectarian activity increases, so does the danger of adminis- 
trative entanglement, and so also does the appearance of govern- 
ment sponsorship. 
b. Political entanglement. Political entanglement can be 
viewed as the involvement of religion in political activity, or the 
67. Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 668 (1970). 
68. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 614 (1971). 
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creation of political divisions along religious lines." Certainly pol- 
itical entanglement is an ill to be avoided. The religious persecu- 
tions that mar English and colonial American history testify of 
the evils of excessive involvement of religion in political affairs.'O 
The threat of political entanglement should not be given 
undue emphasis, however. The dangers of serious political divi- 
sions along religious lines at the present time would appear to be 
quite remote." Recent experience has shown that the issue of 
government aid to church-related education can be discussed 
with remarkable moderation and tolerance on both sides.72 
B. Factors Bearing Upon 
Establishment Clause Analysis 
In deciding establishment clause cases dealing with govern- 
ment programs aiding church-related education, the Supreme 
Court has placed varying degrees of emphasis on at  least five 
different factors: whether aid is limited to secular aspects, 
whether aid is channeled to parents and students rather than to 
schools, whether aid is administered as a one-shot enactment 
rather than a program requiring periodic reexamination, the 
breadth of the class of beneficiaries, and the degree of sectarian- 
ism manifest at aided institutions. The relevance of these factors 
will be considered in the light of the values of neutrality and the 
avoidance of administrative and political entanglement. 
1 .  Aid to secular aspects versus sectarian aspects 
The Supreme Court has purported to disallow all aid that 
flows to the sectarian aspects of church-related ed~cation. '~ This 
construction of the establishment clause creates enormous practi- 
cal problems, since it requires the strict separation of church- 
related education into secular and sectarian parts. Not only is a 
strict separation very likely impossible, since all of the parts of a 
69. Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 372 (1975). 
70. See generally Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 8-11 (1947). 
71. Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 263 (1977) (Powell, J., concurring in part, 
concurring in the judgment in part, dissenting in part); Lewin, Disentangling Myth from 
Reality, 3 J.L. & EDUC. 107, 110-12 (1974). But cf. Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 256 
(1977) (Brennan, J., concurring and dissenting) (Justice Brennan would have disallowed 
all the challenged aid programs on political entanglement grounds); Meek v. Pittenger, 
421 U.S. 349, 373-83 (1975) (Brennan J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (Justice 
Brennan would have disallowed the challenged textbook loan program on the grounds of 
political entanglement). 
72. Lewin, supra note 71, a t  111. 
73. See notes 25-29 and accompanying text supra. 
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school inevitably tend to partake of the character of the whole," 
but attempts to enforce such a separation often have the potential 
of creating serious entanglement? 
According to the principle of educational neutrality, some 
aid to church-related education is justifiable and even desirable. 
Since aid to secular activities frees funds that can be used to 
promote sectarian activities, it makes little difference as a matter 
of practical economics that aid is restricted to secular aspects. 
Indeed, it  could be argued that secular use restrictions produce 
little more than changes in internal accounting  procedure^^^ and 
increased governmental interference and should, therefore, be 
avoided. Two considerations militate against this conclusion. 
First, if the government directly aids specifically sectarian activi- 
ties there is danger that the public will view this as sponsorship 
of religion. Second, a judicious application of secular use restric- 
tions can have the effect of keeping direct aid and, with it, gov- 
ernment regulation away from the sensitive, highly sectarian ele- 
ments of church-related education, thus minimizing rather than 
aggravating administrative entanglement. 
Under the alternative rationale, then, this factor- whether 
aid goes to secular or sectarian aspects-would retain some im- 
portance. However, the Court's present paranoiac fear of allowing 
one penny of government money to aid sectarian activities would 
be exchanged for a more rational sensitivity to actual dangers of 
sponsorship and entanglement. 
2. Aid to parents and students versus aid to schools 
The Supreme Court has generally appeared to be willing to 
approve programs aiding sectarian schools indirectly through 
parents and students more readily than programs providing di- 
rect aid." As a matter of practical economics, this factor is rela- 
tively unimportant. By adjusting tuition rates, sectarian schools 
- --- 
74. The difficulty of separating secular from sectarian aspects is heightened by the 
lack of consensus as to the appropriate constitutional definition of religion. See generally 
Bowser, Delimiting Religion in the Constitution: A Classification Problem, 11 VAL. U.L. 
REV. 163 (1977); Note, Toward a Constitutional Definition of Religion, 91 HAW. L. REV. 
1056 (1978). 
75. See, e.g., Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 370-72 (1975); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 
403 U.S. 602, 614-22 (1971). 
76. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 641 (1971) (Douglas, J., concurring). 
77. See Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 243-44 (1968), Everson v. Board of 
Educ., 330 US .  1, 18 (1947). In approving the programs challenged in both Allen and 
Euerson, the Court noted that no government aid went to parochial schools; rather, it went 
to parents or students. 
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can absorb any aid the government provides to students or par- 
ents. This factor, however, is important in two other respects. 
First, channeling aid to parents and students instead of to schools 
serves as a practical shield against administrative entanglement. 
When aid is administered in this form, sectarian schools remain 
one step removed from direct contact with the government. Al- 
though there is no guarantee that the government will refrain 
entirely from meddling,7R the chances are that interference, regu- 
lation, and hence administrative entanglement will be lessened." 
Second, the dangers of sponsorship are reduced if aid is directed 
to parents and students rather than to schools. The less direct the 
contact between government and sectarian institutions, the less 
the government aid will constitute an official sanction of religion 
in the eyes of the public. Therefore, even though aid to church- 
related education may fall well within the principle of economic 
neutrality, it is better if government money is laundered before 
reaching sectarian schools by passing through a student or parent 
filter. 
3. One-shot enactments versus programs requiring periodic 
reexaminations0 
A certain degree of political divisiveness is engendered when- 
ever legislative bodies consider programs that aid church-related 
education. The less often aid programs come before the legisla- 
ture, the less the threat of political divisions along religious lines. 
Therefore, one-shot enactments should generally be preferred 
over programs that will likely come before the legislature periodi- 
cally for review and revi~ion.~' Since the danger of the develop- 
ment of serious political divisions along religious lines seems 
slight at the present time,RZ this factor should not be given undue 
emphasis under the alternative rationale. 
78. Unfortunately, federal agencies have been known to rely upon the fact that some 
students attending private schools receive federal benefits to assert broad regulatory pow- 
e n  over the internal affairs of these institutions. See Comment, HEW$ Regulation Under 
Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972: Ultra Vires Challenges, 1976 B.Y.U. L. 
REV. 133. Generally speaking, however, it would seem that government regulation of 
sectarian schools would be less likely if aid were channeled to students or parents rather 
than schools. 
79. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403'U.S. 602, 621 (1973). 
80. The Supreme Court has noted the importance of this factor in several opinions. 
E.g., Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 795-98 
(1973); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 622-24 (1971). 
81. In addition, to the extent they limit ongoing financial relationships and depen- 
dencies, one-shot enactments tend to engender less administrative entanglement than 
other aid programs. See Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672,688 (1971) (plurality opinion). 
82. See notes 69-72 and accompanying text supra. 
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4. Breadth of the class of beneficiaries 
The Supreme Court has suggested that the breadth of the 
class of beneficiaries is relevant in detemining the constitution- 
ality of government programs aiding church-related e d u ~ a t i o n . ~ ~  
A general program benefiting both public and private education 
may be held constitutional, while the identical program may be 
disallowed if it benefits only sectarian education. 
This factor is certainly relevant under the alternative ration- 
ale since the justification for allowing aid is to neutralize the 
effects of increasing government expenditures for public educa- 
tion. The principle of educational neutrality, which permits sec- 
tarian schools to participate in the benefits of government pro- 
grams aiding public education to the degree necessary to main- 
tain their current status, requires that there be a corresponding 
program benefiting public education for every program aiding 
sectarian education. 
The types of programs most clearly falling within the princi- 
ple of educational neutrality are general educational subsidies 
providing identical kinds of benefits to both public and private 
schools. Certain departures from this ideal should probably be 
permitted. For example, administrative considerations or entan- 
glement concerns may dictate that aid to sectarian schools take 
a slightly different form than aid to corresponding public schools. 
The principle of sponsorship neutrality, however, suggests that 
radical differences be avoided because they give the impression 
of preferential treatment." Also, to require that every program 
benefiting sectarian education be enacted concurrently with a 
similar program aiding public schools would constitute an unnec- 
essarily severe limitation on legislative prerogatives. Legislators 
should have the option of neutralizing in a single program the 
effects of a series of enactments aiding public schools. However, 
there should be some limitation placed on the power of legislators 
83. See Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 782 
n.38 (1973). 
84. At least three district court decisions have disallowed aid programs that appeared 
to give preferential treatment to parochial schools. Members of Jamestown School Comm. 
v. Schmidt, 427 F. Supp. 1338 (D.R.I. 1977) (interdistrict busing of parochial schoolchil- 
dren held unconstitutional where similar option not afforded to public students); Ameri- 
cans United for Separation of Church & State v. Benton, 413 F. Supp. 955 (S.D. Iowa 
1975) (interdistrict busing of parochial schoolchildren disallowed where similar option not 
afforded to public students); Public Funds for Pub. Schools v. Marburger, 358 F. Supp. 
29, 34-36 (D.N.J. 1973) (reimbursements to parents of parochial students for the costs of 
purchasing secular textbooks disallowed where the state merely loaned textbooks to public 
schoolchildren), aff'd, 417 U.S. 961 (1974). 
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to promulgate aid programs for the purpose of neutralizng the 
effects of past enactments benefiting only public schools. This 
kind of legislation smacks of sponsorship, and in any event, the 
effects of past legislative enactments on present-day sectarian 
schools are very difficult to measure. 
5. Degree of sectarianism manifest at aided institutionss 
This factor is important under the alternative rationale be- 
cause it serves as an indicator of the relative vulnerability of 
different sectarian schools to increasing government expenditures 
for public education, and hence their eligibility for government 
aid according to the principle of educational neutrality. Generally 
speaking, the more sectarian the institution, the less it will be 
affected by government actions relating to public education. This 
factor is also relevant in weighing entanglement and sponsorship 
dangers: the more sectarian the institution, the more serious the 
dangers of sponsorship and entanglement. 
IV. APPLICATION OF THE ALTERNATIVE RATIONALE 
Having set forth the theoretical outlines of an alternative 
rational for aid-to-education cases, this Comment now turns to 
the difficult problem of practical application. The implications of 
the alternative rationale in the contexts of aid to parochial educa- 
tion and aid to sectarian colleges will be considered. 
A. Aid to Parochial Education 
The Supreme Court has described CatholicR6 parochial 
schools in these terms: 
The church schools involved in the program are located 
close to parish churches. This understandably permits conven- 
ient access for religious exercises since instruction in faith and 
morals is part of the total educational process. The school build- 
ings contain identifying religious symbols such as crosses on the 
85. The degree of sectarianism manifest at aided institutions has been an important 
factor in most of the Supreme Court decisions dealing with govenment aid to church- 
related education. See, e.g, Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 249-50 (1977); Meek v. 
Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 363-66 (1975); Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 685-89 (1971) 
(plurality opinion); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 615-19 (1971). 
86. In 1975, over 80% of the students attending nonpublic elementary and secondary 
schools attended Catholic parochial schools. Doem, The Enduring Controversy: Paro- 
chiaid and the Law, 9 VAL. U.L. REV. 513, 522 (1975). Therefore, it is appropriate to view 
programs benefiting nonpublic elementary and secondary schools essentially as programs 
aiding Catholic parochial schools. 
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exterior and crucifixes, and religious paintings and statues ei- 
ther in the classroom or hallways. Although only approximately 
30 minutes a day are devoted to direct religious instruction, 
there are religiously oriented extracurricular activities. Approxi- 
mately two-thirds of the teachers in these schools are nuns of 
various religious orders. Their dedicated efforts provide an at- 
mosphere in which religious instruction and religious vocations 
are natural and proper parts of life in such schools. Indeed, as 
the District Court found, the role of teaching nuns in enhancing 
the religious atmosphere has led the parochial school authorities 
to attempt to maintain a one-to-one ratio between nuns and lay 
teachers in all schools rather than to permit some to be staffed 
almost entirely by lay teachers. 
On the basis of these findings the District Court concluded 
that the parochial schools constituted "an integral part of the 
religious mission of the Catholic Church." The various charac- 
teristics of the schools make them "a powerful vehicle for trans- 
mitting the Catholic faith to the next generation." This process 
of inculcating religious doctrine is, of course, enhanced by the 
impressionable age of the pupils, in primary schools particu- 
larly. In short, parochial schools involve substantial religious 
activity and 
The highest church authorities would agree with the Su- 
preme Court's determination that "parochial schools involve sub- 
stantial religious activity and purpose."aR Attendance of children 
a t  parochial schools is viewed by the Catholic Church as a reli- 
gious o b l i g a t i ~ n . ~ ~  
In light of these facts and findings, it would appear reason- 
able to conclude that the detrimental effect on parochial schools 
of increasing government expenditures for public education is 
87. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U S .  602, 615-16 (1971) (footnote omitted). In Meek v. 
Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975), the Court made these findings with respect to the nature 
of parochial schools: 
The very purpose of many of those schools is to provide an integrated secular 
and religious education; the teaching process is, to a large extent, devoted to 
the inculcation of religious values and belief. . . . Substantial aid to the educa- 
tional function of such schools, accordingly, necessarily results in aid to the 
sectarian school enterprise as a whole. "[Tlhe secular education those schools 
provide goes hand in hand with the religious mission that is the only reason for 
the schools' existence. Within the institution, the two are inextricably inter- 
twined." 
Id. a t  366 (quoting Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 657 (1971) (opinion of Brennan, 
J.)) (citation omitted). 
88. See THE DOCUMENTS OF VATICAN II 644-48 (W. Abbott ed. 1966). 
89. Id. a t  647. Canon law (canon 1374) requires that Catholic students as a rule 
attend Catholic schools. 1 J. ABBOT & J. HANNAN, THE SACRED CANONS 607-08 (2d rev. ed. 
1960). 
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minor." Therefore, under the principle of economic neutrality, 
parochial schools should be allowed to participate in government 
educational assistance programs to a limited extent only. 
Since the Supreme Court has found the prototype parochial 
school to be substantially sectarian, it is appropriate that the 
courts take seriously the dangers of sponsorship and entangle- 
ment in the context of aid to parochial schools. In this regard, 
perhaps the most logical place to draw the line is a t  nonideologi- 
cal student-service functions such as health, transportation, and 
food services. It is less entangling if government and church offi- 
cials consult together about buses, nurses, and school lunch than 
if there is government regulation of classroom activities. Simi- 
larly, the dangers of sponsorship are minimized if government aid 
funds only nonideological service functions directed at students 
rather than schools. 
Systems whereby students would receive a voucher from the 
government entitling them to attend the private or public school 
of their choice have received much discussion in legal literature? 
The fact that vouchers connote no government favoritism for one 
kind of school over another and channel aid to students rather 
than schools makes them unobjectionable from the standpoint of 
sponsorship and administrative entanglement. However, they are 
objectionable inasmuch as they allow for complete participation 
of sectarian schools in government educational subsidies in con- 
travention of the principle of educational neutral it^.^^ 
Shared-time programs whereby students attend classes in 
90. This conclusion could be erroneous. Although it is true that parochial schools are 
experiencing serious financial problems, it is difficult to determine the precise cause or 
causes. For an argument that falling enrollments at parochial schools are more the result 
of ideological conflicts within the Catholic Church than rising tuition costs, see Boles, The 
Burger Court & Parochial Schools: A Study in Law, Politics & Educational Reality, 9 VAL. 
U.L. REV. 459, 476-77 (1975). More sociological research into the question would be help- 
ful. 
91. See, e.g., Note, Voucher Systems of Public Education After Nyquist and Sloan: 
Can a Comtitutional System be Devised?, 72 MICH. L. REV. 895 (1974); Comment, The 
l k e  of Public Funds by Private Schools via Educational Vouchers: Some Constitutional 
Problems, 3 PAC. L.J. 90 (1972); Note, Education Vouchers: The Fruit of the Lemon Tree, 
24 STAN. L. REV. 687 (1972). 
92. Although a full voucher system would be violative of the principle of educational 
neutrality, a partial voucher system with strict limits placed on the amount of subsidy 
permitted to flow to the parents of parochial schoolchildren might be permissible. For 
example, an enactment allowing the parents of all schoolchildren to take a deduction from 
gross income in calculating their state income tax equal to their expenditures for educa- 
tional purposes might be permitted by the principle of educational neutrality. Such an 
enactment was approved in Minnesota Civil Liberties Union v. Roemer, 452 F. Supp. 1316 
(D. Minn. 1978). 
6171 CHURCH-RELATED EDUCATION 639 
both public and parochial schools have also been d i scus~ed .~~  Al- 
though these programs may enable parochial schools to maintain 
higher enrollments than would otherwise be possible, this result 
is attained only at the sacrifice of total control over the educa- 
tional development of participating students. Because of this, it 
is very difficult to assess whether shared-time programs in reality 
constitute a benefit to religion. Therefore, it would seem harsh to 
disallow shared-time programs as violative of the value of neu- 
trality. 
Since public and parochial school officials are required to 
correlate their efforts, there are certain administrative entangle- 
ment problems inherent in shared-time arrangements. Such cor- 
relation would not likely engender the kind of government regula- 
tion of parochial education that is inherent in direct aid pro- 
grams, however, because public and parochial school officials 
would meet as equals to work out solutions to mutual problems. 
Therefore, if government regulation, rather than mere interaction 
between public and parochial school officials, is viewed as the 
primary evil of administrative entanglement, shared-time pro- 
grams should not be disallowed on this basis. 
Under the alternative rationale, the Supreme Court cases in 
the parochial school context do not fare too badly. Except in 
limited circumstances the Court has disallowed parochial school 
participation in government programs that increase public edu- 
cation expenditures. This conforms with the principle of educa- 
tional neutrality. Aid has been restricted, for the most part, to 
nonideological student-service functions, minimizing the dangers 
of sponsorship and administrative entanglement." Certain 
shared-time programs have been approved," and voucher-type 
- - -  
93. See, e.g., Rabinove, Does "Dual Enrollment" Violate the First Amendment?, 3 
J .L.  & EDUC. 129 (1974); Comment, Shared-Time-Permissible Aid to Sectarian 
Education, 17 DE PAUL L. REV. 373 (1968). 
94. The Court has, however, upheld government programs providing free secular 
textbook loans to parochial schoolchildren. See notes 16-17 and accompanying text supra. 
Such programs entail government evaluation of the textbooks used in parochial schools 
and hence a degree of control over the ideological content of classroom activity. In reality, 
however, the control over classroom activity exercised as a result of these programs is 
probably slight. The entanglement and sponsorship problems created therefore are prob- 
ably not serious. 
95. In Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229,244-48 (1977), the Court approved a shared- 
time program whereby parochial students received therapeutic, guidance, and remedial 
services in the public schools, in public centers, or in mobile units located apart from 
parochial school premises. However, government programs providing secular education to 
parochial students on parochial school premises have been disallowed by the district 
courts, mainly on the grounds of excessive entanglement. See Americans United for Sepa- 
ration of Church & State v. Board of Educ., 369 F. Supp. 1059 (E.D. Ky. 1974) (program 
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programs have been disal l~wed.~~ 
B. Aid to Sectarian Colleges 
The Supreme Court has divided the world of church-related 
higher education into two camps, sectarian colleges and perva- 
sively sectarian .colleges. This Subsection will discuss aid to sec- 
tarian colleges, and Subsection C will deal with aid to pervasively 
sectarian colleges. 
The prototype sectarian college is described and contrasted 
with the typical parochial school in this passage from Tilton u. 
Richardson: 
There are generally significant differences between the reli- 
gious aspects of church-related institutions of higher learning 
and parochial elementary and secondary schools. The 
"affirmative if not dominant policy" of the instruction in pre- 
college church schools is "to assure future adherents to a partic- 
ular faith by having control of their total education at  an early 
age." . . . There is substance to the contention that college 
students are less impressionable and less susceptible to religious 
indoctrination. . . . Furthermore, by their very nature, college 
and postgraduate courses tend to limit the opportunities for 
sectarian influence by virtue of their own internal disciplines. 
Many church-related colleges and universities are characterized 
by a high degree of academic freedom and seek to evoke free and 
critical responses from their students. 
. . . In short, the evidence shows institutions with admit- 
tedly religious functions but whose predominant higher educa- 
tional mission is to provide their students with a secular educa- 
tion. 
- -  
whereby school district leased rooms in a parochial school and provided teachers for the 
instruction of parochial schoolchildren in secular subjects held unconstitutional because 
of excessive entanglement and also because the court found that the program had the 
primary effect of advancing religion); Americans United for Separation of Church & State 
v. Paire, 359 F. Supp. 505 (D.N.H. 1973) (program whereby school district leased rooms 
in parochial school and provided teachers for the instruction of parochial schoolchildren 
in secular subjects disallowed on grounds of excessive entanglement); Americans United 
for Separation of Church & State v. Oakey, 339 F. Supp. 545 (D. Vt. 1972) (program 
providing public teachers and educational materials for the teaching of secular subjects 
in parochial schools disallowed on grounds of excessive entanglement). 
96. The Supreme Court has never considered a full voucher system for elementary 
and secondary schools like the one described in the text. However, the Court in Committee 
for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973), disallowed two 
voucher-like programs, a tuition reimbursement program and a tax benefit program, that 
suffered from the same defect as full voucher systems: they had the potential for expand- 
ing into complete subsidies of parochial education, in violation of the principle of educa- 
tional neutrality. See notes 22-24 and accompanying text supra. 
6171 CHURCH-RELATED EDUCATION 641 
Since religious indoctrinaction is not a substantial purpose 
or activity of these church-related colleges and universities, 
there is less likelihood than in primary and secondary schools 
that religion will permeate the area of secular edu~ation.~' 
The typical sectarian college, according to this description, is an 
island of sectarianism encircling the divinity school awash in a 
sea of secular education. This characterization probably fits most 
church-related colleges. Although a degree of sectarianism un- 
doubtedly pervades the atmosphere a t  the typical sectarian col- 
lege, its influence is weak in most parts of the institution. Reli- 
gion, therefore, likely does not play a major role in the decisions 
of students to attend such colleges-with the exception, of course, 
of ministerial students. As a result, sectarian colleges are highly 
vulnerable to government programs that increase expenditures 
for public higher education; accordingly, few restrictions should 
be placed on their participation in such programs. Complete par- 
ticipation should not be allowed, however, because this would 
presumably cause an improvement in the status of such institu- 
tions, in violation of the principle of educational neutrality. 
Sponsorship and administrative entanglement concerns dic- 
tate that direct government aid be prohibited from touching the 
small enclaves of concentrated religiosity remaining in sectarian 
colleges. In other areas, government aid and government regula- 
tion are probably acceptable, since the degree of sectarian influ- 
ence is slight. 
Scholarship and student grant programs are particularly 
appropriate vehicles for aiding sectarian colleges. Sponsorship 
and administrative entanglement dangers, which are not serious 
because of the nature of the aided institutions in any event, would 
be further minimized by such an approach.gR 
97. 403 U.S. 672, 685-87 (1971) (plurality opinion) (citations and footnotes omitted). 
98. Scholarship and similar programs that aid students attending sectarian (as op- 
posed to pervasively sectarian) colleges have generally been upheld in the lower courts. 
For a synopsis of a number of the cases, see note 46 supra. 
There has been some debate as to whether sectarian colleges receiving tuition from 
students aided by government programs should be required to segregate these funds in 
special accounts to be used for secular purposes only. See Smith v. Board of Governors, 
429 F. Supp. 871, 878-79 (W.D.N.C.) (special accounts not required), aff'd, 434 U.S. 803 
(1977); Americans United for the Separation of Church & State v. Dunn, 384 F. Supp. 
714, 721 (M.D. Tenn. 1974) (use of funds received by participating colleges should be 
restricted to secular activities), vacated and remanded sub nom. Blanton v. Americans 
United for the Separation of Church & State, 421 U.S. 958 (1975). It seem doubtful that 
the imposition of such restrictions would alter the fiscal affairs of affected colleges other 
than to effect a change of internal accounting procedures. And, on balance, such restric- 
tions would probably tend to create rather than prevent administrative entanglement and 
642 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [1978: 
The Supreme Court decisions dealing with aid to sectarian 
collegesghre generally unobjectionable. Substantial participa- 
tionlw in aid programs has been allowed, but direct aid has been 
restricted to "secular" aspects.lol This has tended to minimize 
sponsorship and administrative entanglement dangers. Further- 
more, this restriction probably has the practical effect of limiting 
participation of-sectarian colleges in programs subsidizing public 
higher education to the extent necessary to ensure compliance 
with the principle of educational neutrality. 
C.  Aid to Pervasively Sectarian Colleges 
The Supreme Court has intimated that all colleges which do 
not substantially conform with the sectarian college model set 
forth in the previous section will be termed pervasively sectar- 
ian.lo2 Some statements of the Court can be taken as indicating 
that pervasively sectarian institutions should be denied all gov- 
ernment aid.lo3 This result is correct in the case of pervasively 
sectarian colleges that are primarily Bible schools or religious 
seminaries, since these institutions would be essentially unaf- 
fected by increasing government expenditures for public educa- 
tion. This result seems too harsh, however, in the case of perva- 
sively sectarian institutions that are not Bible schools or religious 
seminaries. Although these colleges are generally not as vulner- 
able to increasing funding of public education as their less sectar- 
ian counterparts, they are undoubtedly affected, and under the 
principle of educational neutrality should be allowed some parti- 
cipation in aid programs. 
sponsorship. Therefore, they should not be imposed. See Smith v. Board of Governors, 
429 F. Supp. a t  879. 
99. See notes 40-44 and accompanying text supra. 
100. In two of the three Supreme Court cases dealing with government aid to sectar- 
ian colleges, the programs that were approved aided both public and nonpublic institu- 
tions equally. Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 741 (1973); Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 
672, 676-77 (1971) (plurality opinion). The program approved in the third case aided only 
nonpublic colleges. Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736, 740 (1976) (plurality 
opinion). I t  could be argued, however, that this enactment was an attempt by the state 
legislature to neutralize in one program the ill effects suffered by sectarian and other 
nonpublic colleges due to a series of fairly contemporaneous enactments aiding only public 
colleges. 
101. Since a certain degree of religious influence probably pervades the atmostphere 
at  most sectarian colleges, it would be more accurate to say that direct aid has been 
prohibited from touching the small enclaves of concentrated religiosity remaining in these 
institutions. 
102. See Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736, 755-59 (1976) (plurality 
opinion); Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 743-44 (1973). 
103. E.g., Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736, 755 (1976) (plurality opin- 
ion); Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 743 (1973). 
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In a footnote to his majority opinion in Committee for Public 
Education & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, Mr. Justice Powell 
suggested that participation in scholarship or grant programs 
available to all students attending both public and private col- 
leges may be an appropriate vehicle for aiding pervasively sectar- 
ian colleges. lo4 
Because of the manner in which we have resolved the tui- 
tion grant issue, we need not decide whether the significantly 
religious character of the statute's beneficiaries might differen- 
tiate the present cases from a case involving some form of public 
assistance (e.g. ,  scholarships) made available generally without 
regard to the sectarian-nonsectarian, or public-nonpublic na- 
ture of the institution benefitted. . . . Thus, our decision today 
does not compel, as appellees have contended, the concluson 
that the educational assistance provisions of the "G. I. Bill," 
. . . impermissibly advance religion in violation of the Estab- 
lishment Clause. lo" 
The dangers of sponsorship and administrative entangle- 
ment posed by such programs are substantially reduced, since aid 
is directed to students instead of to schools. Moreover, restricting 
aid to participation in general scholarship and grant programs 
probably has the practical effect of limiting the net assistance to 
these colleges to levels permissible under the principle of educa- 
tional neutrality .Io6 
Government aid to church-related education poses an ex- 
tremely difficult constitutional question. The Supreme Court, in 
the words of Mr. Justice Powell, has "sought to establish princi- 
ples that preserve the cherished safeguard of the Establishment 
Clause without resort to blind absolutism."107 The Court decisions 
104. Presumably, Justice Powell would not have extended these benefits to Bible 
school or religious seminary students. 
There is a conflict of authority among the lower courts as to whether students attend- 
ing pervasively sectarian colleges may be permitted to participate in general scholarship 
or grant programs. See note 46 supra. However, the Supreme Court recently affirmed a 
general assistance program available to pervasively sectarian college students. Americans 
United for Separation of Church & State v. Blanton, 434 U S .  803, aff'g 433 F. Supp. 97 
(M.D. Tenn. 1977). 
105. 413 U S .  756, 782 n.38 (1973) (citations omitted). 
106. Aid to students attending pervasively sectarian colleges should probably be 
restricted to participation in programs that truly aid all college students. Participation of 
these students in programs providing major assistance to nonpublic college students but 
only token assistance to public college students is probably objectionable. 
107. Wolman v. Walter, 433 U S .  229, 263 (1977) (Powell, J., concurring in part, 
concurring in the judgment in part, dissenting in part). 
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have been generally successful in avoiding "blind absolutism," 
but the principles that have been established have been unclear 
and difficult to justify. 
This Comment has proposed an alternative rationale which 
is believed to be more satisfactory. A principle of educational 
neutrality has been defined that resolves the paradox of simulta- 
neous Court adherence to the value of neutrality and approval of 
programs that in fact channel government aid to church-related 
education. This principle, together with the principle of sponsor- 
ship neutrality and the values of avoidance of political and ad- 
ministrative entanglement, serves in large part to justify prior 
Court decisions and provides a framework within which future 
decisions can be made. 
Randolph G .  Muhlestein 
